Distrust by Design: North Carolina's Marine Fisheries Advisory System

How North Carolina's marine fisheries advisory system was built to mirror conflict rather than inform it, and what good science advice would require instead

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Several stellar former graduate students (now on to their own careers) and I have a new paper out, An Evaluation of the Advisory System for North Carolina Marine Fisheries Regulators (gift link).

All over the world, fisheries management is a contentious decision-making process against a background of uncertain science and constraints in data availability.

North Carolina is no different: user group conflict between recreational and commercial fishers is fierce and lawsuits abound.

Nearly thirty years after North Carolina state legislators passed the Fisheries Reform Act of 1997 (FRA) to improve public trust in the state’s marine fisheries regulatory regime, the decision-making process is again characterized by deep distrust, recurring conflict, and declining public confidence.

One facet of widespread frustration is the function of the advisory system for the Marine Fisheries Commission (MFC), the state’s regulatory body. Applications to serve on advisory committees have generally declined, confirming a broader withdrawal of willing participants from the advisory process.

The frequency with which the MFC convenes its advisory committees has also declined, suggesting commissioners are unable or unwilling to engage the legislatively designed and mandated advisory system.

When science advice is done well, it can bolster public trust in the decision-making process and serve as a tool of democratic accountability. However, an advisory system that is poorly designed or implemented can undermine trust and accountability.

Early drafts of the FRA show that the structure of the advisory system had been controversial.

An early draft created a separation between science advice and stakeholder input. Two committees, Habitat/Water Quality and Fisheries Assessment, were expressly intended as

technical committee[s] to be comprised of scientists or other experts in fisheries biology, ecology, water quality, sociology, and economics.

A third committee was a stakeholder group, Fisheries Resources/Users Committee, to be “comprised of members of the fishing public,” and the chairs of three regional committees.

This vision of two standing advisory committees for scientific expertise and a third standing user group advisory committee remained constant until version 6 of House Bill 1097, the version that would become law. In this version, as in the final legislation, the designation of “technical” was removed from all of the committees, and four standing committees were instead defined by a targeted resource: Finfish, Crustacean, Shellfish, and Habitat and Water Quality.

The final bill also directed these advisory committees to mix together stakeholders and scientists, and allowed for inclusion of members representing environmental advocacy.

Ultimately, the FRA specified that the committees be:

composed of commercial and recreational fishermen, scientists, and other persons who have expertise in the matters to be considered by the advisory committee to which they are appointed. In making appointments to advisory committees, the Chair of the Commission shall ensure that both commercial and recreational fishing interests are fairly represented and shall consider for appointment persons who are recommended by groups representing commercial fishing interests, recreational fishing interests, environmental protection and conservation interests, and other groups interested in coastal fisheries management.

Functionally, this meant that the advisory committees largely mirrored the political dynamics of the commission itself and no actual scientific expertise would be on offer.

We analyzed the MFC’s use of the advisory system within the context of three recent and controversial areas of decision-making:

1. area closures for shrimp trawling,

2. southern flounder management plans, and

3. development of a shellfish aquaculture industry.

Our review of these case studies illustrates ways in which the design and implementation of the MFC advisory system undermines collaboration, public trust, and accountability, ultimately diminishing the perceived legitimacy of marine fisheries regulatory decisions.¹

In our closing, we developed recommendations intended to further overarching goals of trust, transparency, and good science advice:

• Separate science advice from stakeholder advice and require engagement between them

• Develop an ethical framework for model development and implementation, and consider development of a participatory modeling process

• Create clear charges for expert advisory committees

• Clarify legislative intent regarding the MFC’s use of science advice and stakeholder engagement

• Legislative confirmation of the MFC chair

  • Since the MFC chair appoints all advisory committee members and determines use of the advisory committees, the chair should be chosen through a process engaging a plurality of viewpoints.

• Do not allow commissioners to serve as advisory committee members

  • Evidently, this needs to actually be said.

There is much more in the article.

Send me a message if you are blocked by the paywall.

1. To be sure, there are likely many ways to improve the regulatory process. We focused on the advisory system.